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In game theory, players have continuous expected payoff functions and can use fixed point theo-
rems to locate equilibria. This optimization method requires that players adopt a particular type of
probability measure space. Here, we introduce alternate probability measure spaces altering the di-
mensionality, continuity, and differentiability properties of what are now the game’s expected payoff
functionals. Optimizing such functionals requires generalized variational and functional optimization
methods to locate novel equilibria. These variational methods can reconcile game theoretic predic-
tion and observed human behaviours, as we illustrate by resolving the chain store paradox. Our
generalized optimization analysis has significant implications for economics, artificial intelligence,
complex system theory, neurobiology, and biological evolution and development.
I. INTRODUCTION
In game theory, as formalized by von Neumann and
Morgenstern [1], Nash [2, 3], and Kuhn [4], rational play-
ers with common knowledge of rationality (CKR) locate
equilibria by using fixed point theorems to optimize con-
tinuous expected payoff functions. These expected pay-
off functions, according to probability measure theory
[5, 6, 7], can only be defined after the adoption of a
suitable probability measure space supporting appropri-
ate random variables, functions, and probability distri-
butions. For instance, mixed strategy probability mea-
sure spaces were used by von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1] and Nash [2, 3], while behavioural strategy proba-
bility measure spaces were introduced by Kuhn [4]. In
addition, correlated strategy probability measure spaces
were introduced by Aumann to model communication
channels between players [8]. In this last case, com-
munications necessitate a change of probability measure
space, however a change of probability space does not
always require communication. Consequently, in this pa-
per we introduce a method to analyze games using the
infinite number of different probability measure spaces
available to describe any given game and set of expected
payoffs [5, 6, 7]. Our particular interest lies in the class
of probability measure spaces which is consistent with
the given game information constraints. That is, we con-
sider only probability measure spaces which are consis-
tent with rationality, CKR, and no communication chan-
nels between players. Such probability measure spaces
can exist, as we show later, simply because a number of
different probability measure spaces are consistent with
information flow via the game history set without any
communication channels. In this paper, we suppose play-
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ers may freely alter their choice of probability measure
space among all those consistent with no communica-
tions or any other alteration in the game, in contrast to,
for instance, previous work on correlated equilibria [8].
For many games, a change in the underlying probabil-
ity measure space will not affect equilibria—witness the
equivalence of mixed and behavioural strategies in games
of perfect recall [4]. However, in this paper, we argue
that there exist games in which altering the choice of
probability measure space will alter strategic equilibria.
Assuming rationality, CKR, and the usual game infor-
mation constraints, players can search an enlarged space
of alternate probability measure spaces to optimize their
expected payoffs, and thereby locate novel equilibria im-
proving their outcomes over those achieved using only
the conventional mixed or behavioural strategy probabil-
ity spaces of game theory.
In this paper, we assess for the first time whether
the set of equilibria of any arbitrary game are entirely
invariant under the altered mathematical parameteriza-
tions defined by different probability measure spaces. It
does appear that equilibria are indeed invariant under al-
ternate probability measure spaces for single-player and
multiple-player-single-stage games. However, equilibria
are not invariant under altered choice of probability mea-
sure space for multiple-player-multiple-stage games. In
these games, the adoption of alternate probability mea-
sure spaces by players can so alter the parameterized ex-
pected payoff functions as to generate entirely novel sets
of equilibria.
Demonstrating this requires a significant generaliza-
tion of the usual optimization methods of game the-
ory. This is because alternate probability measure spaces
and parameterizations can alter the functional form, di-
mensionality, continuity and differentiability properties
of what must now be treated as expected payoff func-
tionals (not functions). As a result, the multiple-player
calculus methods (essentially fixed point theorems) suit-
able for expected payoff functions defined over contin-
2uous probability simplexes are insufficient. To optimize
expected payoff functionals, we must generalize the varia-
tional and functional optimization techniques used in, for
instance, general equilibrium and Cass-Koopmans style
optimal growth analysis [9, 10], Ramsey-style multiple
stage optimization [11, 12, 13], and continuous time dif-
ferential games [14]. Suitably generalized, these varia-
tional and functional optimization techniques can recon-
cile game theoretic prediction and observed human be-
haviour as we illustrate using Selton’s chain store para-
dox [15]. In this game, backwards induction predicts
that a monopolist never fights new market entrants even
though, in practice, most monopolists will indeed fight
new entrants and thereby improve their payoffs. This
led Selton to conclude “mathematically trained persons
recognize the logical validity of the induction argument,
but they refuse to accept it as a guide to practical behav-
ior.” [15]. This stark contrast makes this game a suitable
vehicle for the presentation of our new methods.
II. VARIATIONAL OPTIMIZATION OF
PROBABILITY MEASURE SPACES
We consider the general strategic optimization problem
faced by two players X and Y seeking to maximize their
respected expected payoffs 〈ΠX〉 and 〈ΠY 〉 in a game
where X chooses events x and Y chooses events y to
generate respective payoff outcomes for each player of
ΠX(x, y) and ΠY (x, y). The chosen events x× y are con-
tained in ΩX × ΩY , the set of all possible events in the
game and in both player’s chosen “roulette” randomiza-
tion devices. These devices are used by players to avoid
their choices being forecast and exploited, with the result
that the choice of events is described using a joint prob-
ability distribution PXYxy . As is required in probability
measure theory [5, 6, 7], the definition of this joint prob-
ability distribution requires player X to adopt a proba-
bility measure space PX , and player Y to adopt a prob-
ability measure space PY , such that the joint product
probability measure space PX × PY supports the prob-
ability measure PXYxy . We allow players to vary their
choice of probability measure space to maximize their
expected payoffs. Altogether, the strategic optimization
problem facing each player is
X: max
PX
〈ΠX〉 =
∫
ΩX×ΩY
dPXYxy Π
X(x, y)
(1)
Y : max
PY
〈ΠY 〉 =
∫
ΩX×ΩY
dPXYxy Π
Y (x, y).
Here, expected payoffs for each player Z ∈ {X,Y } are
defined by a Lebesgue integral over all possible game
and roulette events ΩX × ΩY of payoffs ΠZ(x, y) re-
sulting from particular game events (x, y) weighted by
the joint probability measure of those events occurring
PXYxy . The optimization involves each player Z maximiz-
ing their expected payoff over every possible joint prob-
ability measure space that might be adopted PX × PY ,
where PZ = {ΩZ , σZ , PZ} is defined in terms of an ap-
propriate event set ΩZ modelling all game and roulette
device events, a suitable sigma-algebra σZ , and an ap-
propriate probability measure PZ .
Game theory has not previously allowed rational play-
ers to vary their choice of probability space to maxi-
mize their expected payoffs. This is largely because von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s original goal was to formu-
late strategic plans assessing every possible move in a
game [1], and they considered this goal required only that
each player adopt a particular probability measure space
defining mixed strategies in any game. (Kuhn later in-
troduced alternate behavioural strategy probability mea-
sure spaces providing an equivalent analysis in games of
perfect recall [4].) While never stated explicitly, this re-
striction essentially limits the search space of the players
so they can only optimize over the probability parame-
ters of a single type of probability space using fixed point
theorems to locate Nash equilibria. In contrast, we ar-
gue that, under CKR, players can search every alternate
probability space consistent with game information con-
straints by using generalized variational and functional
optimization techniques. In the remainder of this section,
we seek to explain heuristically why such a generalized
analysis can generate novel and improved equilibria, and
thus reconcile game theoretic prediction and observed hu-
man behaviours.
Alternate probability measure spaces can support dif-
ferent equilibria in strategic situations as each adopted
probability space can mathematically parameterize the
same random event in very different ways. For example,
consider a player X seeking to optimize a binary out-
come specified by a random variable taking value x = 0
with probability PX(0) or x = 1 with probability PX(1).
These probabilities can be characterized in terms of a sin-
gle probability parameter p by tossing a biased coin, or
in terms of five probability parameters (p1, p2, p3.p4, p5)
say by using a biased dice. An alternative probabil-
ity measure space might employ two sequentially tossed,
independent, biased coins producing outcomes u = 1
with probability p, while if u = 0 then v = 1 with
probability q and if u = 1 then v = 1 with probabil-
ity r. The subsequent adoption of the random variable
x = δu1δv1 defines P
X(1) = P (u = 1, v = 1) = pr.
(Here, δab = 1 if a = b and zero otherwise.) As a last il-
lustration, consider a probability measure space in which
the above two biased coins are now perfectly correlated
via P (u, v) = P (u)P (v|u) = P (u)δuv = P (u). In this
case, the known perfect correlation introduces a delta
function to reduce the dimensionality of the joint distri-
bution P (u, v) giving PX(1) = P (u = 1, v = 1) = p. In
general, when parameterized using different probability
measure spaces, a given probability possesses alternate
functional forms with different dimensionality, correla-
tion, continuity, and differentiability properties.
This changeability of functional form and dimension-
3ality requires generalized variational and functional opti-
mization methods be used to optimize strategic decisions.
The generalized methods we develop extend the calcu-
lus of variations which typically optimizes a functional
F [f(x), f ′(x)] of known form, and where the functional
F , the function f(x), and the gradient f ′(x) have spec-
ified differentiability properties. For instance, a short-
est path problem seeks to optimize the known functional
F [f(x), f ′(x)] =
√
1 + f ′2 via
max
f,f ′
I =
∫ b
a
√
1 + f ′2dx. (2)
Similarly, the shortest time or Brachistochrone problem
optimizes the known functional F [f(x), f ′(x)] =
√
1+f ′2
2gf
via
max
f,f ′
I =
∫ b
a
√
1 + f ′2
2gf
dx. (3)
Lastly, a typical multiple stage Ramsey-style utility max-
imization problem optimizes
max
f,f ′
I =
∫ b
a
e−rxF [f − f ′]dx, (4)
where now only the functional dependencies and
certain differentiability properties of the functional
F [f(x), f ′(x)] are specified. To our knowledge, all appli-
cations of the calculus of variations place severe restric-
tions on the range of variation of the form of the func-
tional being optimized, so much so that a problem with
an entirely arbitrary functional would be considered ill
defined. In contrast, in a strategic optimization problem,
players are able to arbitrarily vary their choice of prob-
ability measure space to alter all of the functional form,
the dimensionality, and the continuity and differentiabil-
ity properties of the functional being optimized. Heuris-
tically, in single player terms, the optimization problem
becomes
max
f,f ′
I =


...
∫ b
a
√
1 + f ′2dx
∫ b
a
√
1+f ′2
2gf dx
∫ b
a
e−rxF [f − f ′]dx
...
. (5)
That is, each player has the option of first choosing a pa-
rameterizing probability measure space to alter the func-
tional form, dimensionality, continuity and differentia-
bility properties of the functionals being optimized, and
only then to optimize the chosen functional over all possi-
ble variations of f(x) and f ′(x). More importantly, each
of their choices affects their opponent’s functionals, while
at the same time, their opponent’s decisions are similarly
altering their own functionals.
a b
f(a)
f(b)
A
f(x)+ δ f(x) f(x)
f(x)
x
FIG. 1: The variational optimization of the functional
F [f(x), f ′(x)] requires the variation of both the function
f(x)→ f(x) + δf(x) and independently, its gradient f ′(x)→
f ′(x)+δf ′(x) over the region [a, b]. That is, through any point
“A”, every possible gradient must be considered in order to
perform a complete variational analysis.
We suggest that this variability of the strategic func-
tionals means that optimization requires independent ex-
amination of every possible functional, and every possible
functional gradient, that might be defined by the play-
ers. That is, we generalize the standard optimization
algorithm of the calculus of variations in which func-
tionals F [f(x), f ′(x)] of known form are optimized by
an independent variation of the function f and the gra-
dient f ′. This independent variation of each of the co-
ordinates (f, f ′) over every possible value allows for in-
stance, derivation of the Euler-Lagrange equations pro-
viding the first order optimization conditions. This is
depicted in Fig. 1 showing that every possible gradient
and trajectory through any point “A” in the parameter
space must be considered to locate optimal trajectories.
Any restrictions on this search of all possible trajectories
constrains the optimization. For instance, when players
are restricted to using only a particular type of proba-
bility measure space, i.e. mixed or behavioural strategy
spaces, then expected payoff functions have fixed func-
tional form, are continuous, and possess a single gradient
at every point in the joint function space. These restric-
tions allow use of the calculus (effectively fixed point the-
orems) rather than a generalized calculus of variations to
locate equilibria.
We argue that, under CKR, players should potentially
benefit from the ability to search an enlarged mathemat-
ical space including many alternative joint probability
measure spaces. A complete search of this enlarged math-
ematical space requires that they examine not only every
possible value of the expected payoff functions at every
point in their parameter space, but also every possible
gradient at every one of those points. In the follow-
ing, we show that different probability measure spaces
4can associate different gradients with the same point in
the joint expected payoff function space, and we argue
that every such possible gradient must be taken into
account in any complete variational and functional op-
timization. That is, when players X and Y are seek-
ing to optimize their respective expected payoffs 〈ΠX〉
and 〈ΠY 〉, they must examine not only every possible
pair of joint values
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
but also every possi-
ble joint gradient
(
∂〈ΠX〉
∂p1
,
∂〈ΠX〉
∂p2
, . . . ,
∂〈ΠY 〉
∂q1
,
∂〈ΠY 〉
∂q2
, . . .
)
evaluated with respect to every possible parameteriza-
tion (p1, p2, . . . , q1, q2, . . .) defined in every possible joint
probability measure space.
     1-p                                                p
1-q                        q                                                1-r                         r
 x:                              0                                                                    1
 y:                0                                   1                          0                                  1 
(P
X
,P
Y
):       (31)                              (22)                      (14)                             (43) 
(a)
     1-p                                                p
 x:              0                                                                1
(P
X
,P
Y
):     (31)                                                          (43) 
 y:              0                                                                1
(b)
FIG. 2: A simple example two-player-two-stage perfect infor-
mation game showing the different game decision trees specific
to players adopting the respective joint probability spaces (a)
PX0 × P
Y
0 where optimal player choices are (x, y) = (0, 1)
generating expected payoffs
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (2, 2), and (b)
PX0 × P
Y
1 where optimal player choices are (x, y) = (1, 1)
generating expected payoffs
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (4, 3).
III. VARIATIONAL OPTIMIZATION IN
MULTIPLE STAGE GAMES
In this section, we use a simple two-player-two-stage
game to introduce standard mathematical methods that
have not previously been applied in game analysis. Our
goal is to demonstrate that even simple games can exhibit
expected payoffs with multiple functional forms, multiple
gradients and multiple trajectories at the same point in
the parameter space necessitating use of variational op-
timization methods.
Suppose two players, denoted Z ∈ {X,Y }, each seek
to optimize their own outcomes in a strategic interaction,
where in stage one X makes a choice of x = 0 or x = 1.
In the second stage, player Y is aware of the opponent’s
previous choice and must also make a choice of y = 0 or
y = 1 at which point the game terminates and players
obtain payoffs ΠZ(x, y) as shown in Fig. 2(a).
Game theory analyzes this game by having each player
adopt a joint probability space allowing the complete
analysis of every possible choice that might be made
in the game. In this game, both players suppose that
X adopts a probability space PX0 with random variable
x ∈ {0, 1} taking value x = 1 with probability p. In turn,
both players suppose that player Y chooses a probability
space allowing for any degree of correlation ρ between
the observable game events x and y, that is, that these
variables might be perfectly correlated ρxy = 1, or per-
fectly anti-correlated ρxy = −1, or entirely uncorrelated
ρxy = 0, or any value in between. Player Y does this by
adopting the probability space PY0 with random variables
y, u, v ∈ {0, 1} with u and v independent and taking val-
ues u = 1 with probability q and v = 1 with probability
r. The random variable y is functional determined to be
y =


u if x = 0
v if x = 1,
(6)
giving
P Y (y|x) =


P Y (0|0) = 1− q
P Y (1|0) = q
P Y (0|1) = 1− r
P Y (1|1) = r
. (7)
As desired, this choice of probability space allows the
players to examine every possible correlation state be-
tween x and y defined as
ρxy(p, q, r) =
〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉√
〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2
√
〈y2〉 − 〈y〉2
=
√
p(1− p)(r − q)√
[q + p(r − q)] [1− q − p(r − q)]
. (8)
Then, x and y are perfectly correlated at ρxy(p, 0, 1) = 1,
perfectly anti-correlated at ρxy(p, 1, 0) = −1, and uncor-
related if either p = 0 or 1 or q = r giving ρxy = 0.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), in the joint probability space
PX0 × P
Y
0 , the expected payoff functions are
〈ΠX00(p, q, r)〉 =
1∑
xy=0
PX(x)P Y (y|x)ΠX(x, y)
= 3− q + p(q + 3r − 2)
〈ΠY00(p, q, r)〉 =
1∑
xy=0
PX(x)P Y (y|x)ΠY (x, y)
= 1 + q − p(q + r − 3), (9)
so the gradients with respect to the three continuous de-
pendent variables p, q and r are
∂〈ΠX00(p, q, r)〉
∂p
= q + 3r − 2
5(b)(a)
P
X
 = 3 + p
  0                                  1 
   p
   p
   q
   rP
X
 = 3 + p
P
Y
 = 1 + 2 p
P
X
 = 2 + 2 p
P
Y
 = 2 + p
P
X
 = 3 - 2 p
P
Y
 = 1 + 3 p
P
X
 = 2 - p
P
Y
 = 2 + 2 p
   p
   q
   r
(c)
FIG. 3: (a) Game theory adopts a joint probability measure space PX0 ×P
Y
0 in which expected payoffs vary over three dimensions
(p, q, r) and where positive gradients with respect to q and r (dotted arrows) and with respect to p (solid arrow) ensure that
players maximize joint payoffs by choosing (p, q, r) = (0, 1, 0). (b) An alternate joint probability space PX0 × P
Y
1 in which
expected payoffs vary solely over a single dimension p with positive gradients with respect to p (solid arrow) ensuring that
players optimize payoffs by choosing p = 1. (c) The choice of two alternate probability spaces (more are possible) associates two
different total gradients (double-lined arrows) with any point along the perfect correlation line ρxy = 1 at (q, r) = (0, 1) with(
∂〈ΠX
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂p
,
∂〈ΠY
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂q
,
∂〈ΠY
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂r
)∣∣∣
(q,r)→(0,1)
6=
(
∂〈ΠX
01
(p)〉
∂p
)
. In the absence of any effective decision procedure privileging
any one space over another, players should examine all possible spaces, all possible gradients, and all possible trajectories.
∂〈ΠY00(p, q, r)〉
∂q
= 1− p
∂〈ΠY00(p, q, r)〉
∂r
= −p. (10)
As shown in Fig. 3(a), this three-dimensional gradient
exists and is non-zero even when x and y are perfectly
correlated ρxy = 1 at all points (q, r) = (0, 1) so pay-
offs are not optimized at these points. In fact, given
the choice of probability space PX0 × P
Y
0 , both play-
ers conclude that Y maximizes their payoff by setting
(q, r) = (1, 0) while X maximizes their payoff by setting
p = 0. The resulting move choices are (x, y) = (0, 1) gen-
erating payoffs of
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (2, 2). This completes
our analysis of the usually adopted joint probability mea-
sure space, and we now turn to examine alternatives.
In any game, alternate joint probability measure spaces
exist with expected payoff functions of different func-
tional form and different gradients at the same point in
the parameter space. Suppose that player Y chooses a
different probability space PY1 in which they treat the
observed value of the random variable x as a coin toss de-
termining their choice of y = 1 with probability p. That
is, Y functionally assigns the random variable y to be
perfectly correlated with the observed random variable x
via
y = x
P Y (y|x) = δyx. (11)
This functional assignment does not require any com-
munication between player X and Y . Then, in the joint
probability space PX0 ×P
Y
1 , the expected payoff functions
straightforwardly equal
〈ΠX01(p)〉 =
1∑
xy=0
PX(x)P Y (y|x)ΠX(x, y)
= 3 + p
〈ΠY01(p)〉 =
1∑
xy=0
PX(x)P Y (y|x)ΠY (x, y)
= 1 + 2p, (12)
as seen in the decision tree of Fig. 2(b), and in the ex-
pected payoff function space of Fig. 3(b). These ex-
pected payoff functions are now dependent only on the
single freely varying parameter p determining the gradi-
ent with respect to p to be
∂〈ΠX01(p)〉
∂p
= 1. (13)
Consequently, playerX maximizes their payoff by setting
p = 1 to choose x = 1 leading Y to set y = 1. Thus, in
the joint probability space PX0 × P
Y
1 , player payoffs are(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (4, 3).
We now have two possible joint probability spaces; that
normally adopted in game theory PX0 ×P
Y
0 and the novel
6 X:                       P
X
                                       P
X
          ……….                    P
X    
 Y:   P
Y
            P
Y
     ….            P
Y
  ….                                               ….               
 0                                                    1                                                         i   
 0                  1                                j   
 ….                                               
 x:   0         1          0         1
 y:  0 1    0  1          0      1
Optimize via 
Calculus
Optimize via functional and variational calculus
FIG. 4: A schematic representation of a complete analysis of the simple game of Fig. 2 showing that each player must first
decide which probability space to adopt. Here, players X and Y simultaneously choose their respective probability spaces PXi and
PYj from among an infinite number of possibilities, where each choice generates a different decision tree for the game defining
altered payoff functions. Players do not know their opponent’s choice of probability space. Given the adoption of a particular
joint probability space PXi ×P
Y
j , expected payoff functions are known and continuous in terms of their input parameters so the
calculus, suitably generalized for multiple-player strategic interactions, can be used to optimize payoffs. However, optimizing
the choice of joint probability space involves expected payoff functionals requiring players to use variational calculus methods to
optimize payoffs.
PX0 × P
Y
1 . In these alternate spaces, the expected pay-
off functions possess exactly the same value when x and
y are perfectly correlated but possess entirely different
gradients at this point—see Fig. 3(c). Variational opti-
mization principles insist that every possible functional
form and gradient must be taken into account in any
complete optimization. These principles permit players
to infinitely vary the “immutable” functional assignments
defining any space (i.e. y = δx0u+δx1v and y = x above),
providing access to a vastly larger decision space than
usually analyzed in game theory. It is not a question of
which space is best, rather, it is a question of either re-
stricting the analysis to a single space or allowing players
to analyze all possible spaces.
Game theory adopts expected payoff “functions”
〈ΠZ00(p, q, r)〉 allowing examination of every possible com-
bination of payoff values and assumes that this is suffi-
cient for optimization. However, while these functions
can duplicate every possible payoff value, they cannot
duplicate every possible functional gradient—and opti-
mization depends on gradients. When Y adopts a ran-
domization device (a “roulette”) which perfectly cor-
relates x and y via the probability space PY1 , then
certainly 〈ΠZ00(p, 0, 1)〉 = 〈Π
Z
01(p)〉, but these func-
tions have different dimensionality and gradients. That
is,
(
∂〈ΠX
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂p
,
∂〈ΠY
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂q
,
∂〈ΠY
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂r
)∣∣∣
(q,r)→(0,1)
6=(
∂〈ΠX
01
(p)〉
∂p
)
. Similar results apply for points at dif-
ferent correlation values ρxy; should Y adopt a ran-
domization device where y is entirely uncorrelated
with x via a new probability space PY2 , then cer-
tainly 〈ΠZ00(p, q, q)〉 = 〈Π
Z
02(p, q)〉 but these func-
tions again have different dimensionality and gra-
dients
(
∂〈ΠX
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂p
,
∂〈ΠY
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂q
,
∂〈ΠY
00
(p,q,r)〉
∂r
)∣∣∣
r=q
6=(
∂〈ΠX
02
(p,q)〉
∂p
,
∂〈ΠY
02
(p,q)〉
∂q
)
. These inequalities result as the
usually adopted space PX0 ×P
Y
0 evaluates gradients using
infinitesimals between points with different correlations
so ∆ρxy = ρxy(p, q, r)−ρxy(p+ δp, q+ δq, r+ δr) 6= 0. In
contrast, when a roulette possesses a known correlation
state as in the spaces PX0 × P
Y
1 or P
X
0 × P
Y
2 , then gra-
dients are evaluated taking all constraints into account
ensuring ∆ρxy = 0. Game analysis does not include every
possible correlation constraint or every possible roulette,
and taking these alternatives into account requires the
variational methods presented in this paper.
We suggest that the example game described in the
two decision trees of Fig. 2 is best seen as having
the schematic form shown in Fig. 4 in which play-
7 X:                                                                   P
X
 Y:                       P
Y
                                        P
Y
                                 P
Y  
 0 
 -                                                     0                                            +  
 x:                     0                   1                        0                  1                        0                  1
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FIG. 5: An extended decision tree for the chain store paradox where player X adopts the usual probability space PX0 with
certainty while Y has a choice of three alternate probability spaces PYj for j ∈ {−, 0,+} selected with probabilities a, b, and c,
and respectively denoting anti-correlated, independent, and correlated decision making. Game theory examines only the branch
generated by the joint probability space PX0 × P
Y
0 in which a potential new market entrant X must decide to either stay out of
a new market x = 0 or enter the market x = 1 (with probability p), in which case the monopolist Y chooses to either acquiesce
y = 0 or fight their entry y = 1 (with probability r), with the corresponding payoffs shown.
ers must first choose which probability space they will
adopt, where this choice is unknown to their opponents
at the commencement of the game, and must then op-
timize their payoffs given the possible joint probabil-
ity spaces that might be adopted. In such generalized
trees incorporating choice of probability space, standard
approaches can be applied to locate pure “variational”
strategies, probabilistic “variational” mixed and “varia-
tional” behavioural strategies, and “variational” equilib-
ria. Of course, introducing “variational” mixed and be-
havioural strategies means that players must introduce
yet further probability spaces allowing the optimization
of these probabilistic strategies.
To provide a concrete illustration of our approach, we
now show that rational players using variational opti-
mization methods can resolve the chain store paradox.
IV. RESOLVING THE CHAIN STORE
PARADOX
A minimal chain store paradox is shown as the central
branch in Fig. 5 generated by the adoption of the joint
probability space PX0 ×P
Y
0 (defined below). This game is
played over two sequential stages where first, a potential
market entrant X must decide to either stay out of a new
market x = 0 or enter that market x = 1. Their oppo-
nent, the monopolist Y , observes this choice. Should no
market entry occur, X neither gains nor loses any payoff
while Y gains monopolist profits so (ΠX ,ΠY ) = (0, 1).
In contrast, should X enter the market, Y must then
decide whether to acquiesce to their opponent’s entry
y = 0 by leaving prices unchanged and sharing profits so
(ΠX ,ΠY ) = (1, 0), or by driving X out of business by
price cutting so payoffs are (ΠX ,ΠY ) = (−1,−1).
A backwards induction analysis of the central branch
of Fig. 5 in isolation indicates that X will enter the mar-
ket confident that the monopolist will not forego profits
to fight their entry [15]. Based on this, many economists
argue it is irrational for monopolists to engage in preda-
tory pricing to drive rivals out of business as predation is
costly while potential new entrants well understand that
price cuts are temporary and monopoly profits readily
attract new market entrants [16]. Efforts to resolve the
paradox include introducing multiple stages permitting
reputation and deterrence effects [15], as well as asym-
metric information, mistakes, bounded rationality or im-
perfect information and uncertainty [16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
For a review, see [21].
The decision and payoff combinations above define the
general strategic optimization problem faced by the play-
ers in the chain store paradox as
X: max
PX
〈ΠX〉 = PX(1)
[
1− 2P Y (1|1)
]
(14)
Y : max
PY
〈ΠY 〉 = 1− PX(1)− PX(1)P Y (1|1).
Here, players alter their choice of joint probability space
PX × PY such that, within the selected optimal joint
probability space, the optimization of their respective
8probability distributions PX(x) and P Y (y|x) allows opti-
mal choices (x, y) to be made so as to maximize respective
payoffs.
A complete derivation of the “variational” equilibria
of the extended tree of Fig. 5 is of course possible (and
indicates that as long as Y sets c + br ≥ 12 , most eas-
ily achieved by choosing c = 1, then X maximizes their
payoff through the choice p = 0). In this paper, we lo-
cate pure variational equilibria in the chain store game.
That is, we suppose that player X always chooses PX0
(other choices are possible) while player Y chooses with
certainty any of the three probability spaces PYj with
j ∈ {−, 0,+}. The interpretation of these latter spaces is
that j =“−” indicates that y is perfectly anti-correlated
to x, j =“0” indicates that y is entirely independent, and
j =“+” indicates that y is perfectly correlated to x—see
Fig. 5.
First, we replicate the usual game analysis by suppos-
ing that player X adopts a probability space PX0 with
random variable x ∈ {0, 1} such that x = 1 with proba-
bility p, while player Y adopts the probability space PY0
with random variables y, u, v ∈ {0, 1} such that u and
v are independent random variables taking value u = 1
with probability q and v = 1 with probability r, and
where the random variable y is functionally assigned as
y = δx0u + δx1v. Altogether, this gives the same proba-
bility parameterization for P Y (y|x) as appears in Eq. 7.
In the joint probability space PX0 ×P
Y
0 , the optimization
problem reduces to
X: max
p
〈ΠX00〉 = P
X(1)
[
1− 2P Y (1|1)
]
= p(1− 2r)
(15)
Y : max
r
〈ΠY00〉 = 1− P
X(1)− PX(1)P Y (1|1)
= 1− p− pr,
so the gradients with respect to the two continuous de-
pendent variables p and r are
∂〈ΠX00〉
∂p
= 1− 2r
∂〈ΠY00〉
∂r
= −p. (16)
Essentially then, the monopolist Y maximizes their ex-
pected payoff by setting r = 0 and always acquiesces to
new market entrants, while X maximizes their payoff by
choosing p = 1 and so always decides to enter the mar-
ket. The resulting expected payoffs given that players
adopt this sole perfect Nash equilibria of (p, r) = (1, 0)
are
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (1, 0).
Suppose however that playersX and Y choose the joint
probability space PX0 ×P
Y
+ (the rightmost branch of Fig.
5) where y is perfectly correlated with x via the functional
assignment y = x and P (y|x) = δyx altering the strategic
optimization problem to
X: max
p
〈ΠX0+〉 = P
X(1)
[
1− 2P Y (1|1)
]
= −p
(17)
Y : 〈ΠY0+〉 = 1− P
X(1)− PX(1)P Y (1|1)
= 1− 2p.
These expected payoff functions are continuous over the
single freely varying parameter p giving the gradient
∂〈ΠX0+〉
∂p
= −1 < 0 (18)
ensuring that player X maximizes their expected payoff
by setting p = 0 and not entering the market. That is,
when players (X,Y ) adopt the PX0 ×P
Y
+ joint probability
space, they maximize their payoffs via the combination
(x, y) = (0, 0) to garner payoffs
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (0, 1).
Alternatively, in the anti-correlated joint probability
space PX0 × P
Y
− (the leftmost branch of Fig. 5), y is
perfectly anti-correlated with x via y = (1 − x) and
P (y|x) = δy(1−x) giving the altered strategic optimiza-
tion problem of
X: max
p
〈ΠX0−〉 = P
X(1)
[
1− 2P Y (1|1)
]
= p
(19)
Y : 〈ΠY0−〉 = 1− P
X(1)− PX(1)P Y (1|1)
= 1− p.
Again, these are functions of the sole parameter p giving
the gradients
∂〈ΠX0−〉
∂p
= 1 > 0, (20)
ensuring that player X sets p = 1 and chooses to en-
ter the market. The result is that when players (X,Y )
adopt the PX0 × P
Y
− joint probability space, they maxi-
mize their payoffs via the combination (x, y) = (1, 0) to
garner payoffs
(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
= (1, 0).
Altogether, when players consider only pure varia-
tional strategies (specifying probability spaces and move
choices), the various payoffs available are(
〈ΠX〉, 〈ΠY 〉
)
PX0
PY− (1, 0)
PY0 (1, 0)
PY+ (0, 1),
(21)
making it evident that to maximize their expected pay-
off, player Y must rationally elect to use probability space
PY+ in preference to either P
Y
0 or P
Y
− . That is, Y will un-
dertake to functionally correlate their move to the previ-
ous choice of the potential market entrant, and thereby
deny themselves a choice about the setting of y once the
9game has commenced. In the probability space PY+ , the
optimization by player Y has no second stage component
as the joint probability distributions are inseparable, and
an opportunity for a second stage optimization exist only
in the space PY0 . Player Y foregoes a choice during the
game itself knowing this to be payoff maximizing. Player
X , being aware of this will not enter the market as in the
minimal chain store game described by PX0 × P
Y
+ , en-
try automatically invokes retaliation. We thus reconcile
game theoretic prediction and observed human behaviour
implying human players generally commence a strategic
analysis by first optimizing their choice of probability
space and only subsequently optimizing the probability
distributions defined by that space.
It is of course possible to consider a broader range of
joint probability spaces for both playersX and Y , though
this will not substantially alter the conclusion here that
it can be rational for a monopolist to punish market en-
trants to resolve the chain store paradox.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper locates strategic equilibria using general-
ized calculus of variation techniques and is thus consis-
tent with, and extends, the more usual methods of game
theory based on the fixed point theorems of the calculus
[22, 23]. We hold that under CKR, players might often
improve their outcomes by expanding their mathematical
search space to include alternate probability spaces. Con-
sequently, we allow players to first optimize their choices
of probability measure space which alters both the ex-
pected payoff functionals (not functions) and the joint
probability distributions specifying move choices to lo-
cate “variational” equilibria. Generally, these variational
equilibria differ from Nash equilibria even in perfect infor-
mation games such as the chain store paradox considered
here. This is because first, players are uncertain about
which joint probability measure space is in play, and sec-
ond, each alternative space introduces different correla-
tions rendering the joint probability distribution insep-
arable and altering allowable subgame decompositions
and the backwards induction analysis. We show that
when rational players variationally optimize their choice
of probability measure space to access “variational” equi-
libria, then this can reconcile game theoretic prediction
and observed human behaviour. To illustrate this, we
demonstrated that our general variational and functional
optimization approaches resolve the chain store paradox.
This strongly suggests that rational players should, in
fact, exploit unrestricted optimization in general.
More generally, we suggest that selfish “homo eco-
nomicus” might exploit variational optimization to ac-
cess alternate probability measure spaces to exhibit al-
truistic or cooperative behaviour whenever that is payoff-
maximizing. This might explain for instance, the efficacy
of state led development processes [24, 25] and the indus-
try wide correlations of the “Just-In-Time” Toyota pro-
duction system [26, 27]. Consequently, variational op-
timization may change the orientation and methods of
evolutionary game theory [28] and quantum game the-
ory [29], among other fields, while the need to search
infinite numbers of joint probability spaces will reinforce
the importance of learning, a principal feature of evolu-
tionary economics [30]. Similarly, variational optimiza-
tion will impact “selfish gene” theory which presently
holds that genes optimize their fitness independently so
altruism is explained by relatedness and the likelihood
of shared genes [31]. In contrast, we suggest that mod-
elling the evolution of emergent hierarchical complexity
in living organisms requires taking account of alterna-
tive probability spaces correlating system components;
correlated entities together constitute an indivisible unit
which must be optimized as a whole. Consequently, com-
plex multicellular eukaryotes might well have optimized
fitness by adopting correlating signals to multitask their
dynamics by exploring alternate dynamical decision trees
(organismal probability spaces) most likely by expansion
of their RNA signaling capabilities [32, 33, 34]. Similar
considerations mean that neural networks can endoge-
nously modify correlations among their components to
explore an infinite number of alternate dynamical trees
to implement complex cognition. Game analysis also un-
derlies the tree search “minimax” algorithms of artificial
intelligence [35, 36, 37] which typically fail to emulate
human intelligence. In chess playing, for instance, ex-
pert human players typically employ pattern recognition
and “chunking” [38], and appear to be exploiting the
same correlation information that underpins variational
optimization. This is consistent with the “social intelli-
gence” explanation for the runaway evolution of primate
intelligence where individuals dynamically realign their
strategic partnerships to correlate behaviours to optimize
outcomes in competitive group settings [39, 40].
It has long been thought that any strategic opti-
mization problem was essentially equivalent to a possi-
bly greatly enlarged non-strategic optimization problem.
This equivalence arises as each player can introduce suf-
ficient new variables to fully model all of the possible
actions of all of their opponents. As a result, strate-
gic optimization has been thought to be of equivalent
complexity to, for instance, non-strategic physics opti-
mization problems, and solved by similar methods such
as the calculus of variations or the calculus. Some have
argued the converse. A perceived fundamental incom-
patibility between physics and biological complexity mo-
tivated Mayr to claim that biology is an autonomous sci-
ence rather than a subbranch of the physical sciences [41],
with the factor missing in physics but present in biology
being identified as “entailment” (essentially correlation)
by Rosen [42], while it has been unconventionally argued
that information science is incomplete and that it is our
growing understanding of genomic programming and bi-
ological complexity that will contribute significant new
insights in this field (J. S. Mattick, personal communi-
cation). Variational optimization might well help close
10
these perceived gaps.
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